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In the 2000s, multiculturalism has been widely debated by politicians in Europe. It is 
argued that there has been a general backlash against multicultural policies (Vertovec 
and Wessendorf 2010). In this article, the support for a backlash against multicultural 
policies coming from populist and far-right parties is studied in the case of the minority 
rights statements of a political party in Finland called the ‘True Finns’ (or officially the 
‘Finns Party’ since 2011). The study is based on an analysis of the discourse found in 
the official party programmes and in the explicit political statements on minority rights 
by Members of Parliament (MPs). 
 
The Finns party constitutes a good example of the new populist parties in Europe. The 
party has recently received considerable support in elections, receiving almost one fifth 
of the votes in the Finnish parliamentary elections in 2011 and 2015. It has explicitly 
proclaimed that it is ‘populist’ and for the purpose of this article it is significant that it is 
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the only party in Finland that has declared an objection to multicultural policies. Of 
course, it is not surprising to find that a populist party is critical of minority rights. 
However, this article analyses the rhetoric to find out how the opposition to minority 
rights is argued and how it is played out in the Finnish context. The backlash against 
multiculturalism is often understood as an opposition to specific policies, often policies 
related to immigration and immigrants (cf. Kymlicka 2010). Likewise, studies of 
populist parties in the other Nordic countries indicate that an opposition to immigration 
is high on the policy agenda of these parties (Widfeldt 2015; Hellström 2016). In 
contrast, this article point out that the populist rhetoric of the Finns party relatively 
seldom mentions or identifies specific policies. Actually, many of the statements about 
minority rights do not relate to minorities at all, but to the majority and its rights. As this 
article describes, the Finns party often portrays itself as the defender of a (real or 
imagined) majority. Furthermore, this defence of the majority is often connected to 
exclusionary perceptions of the modern welfare state. Thus, this article argues that the 
populist rhetoric about minority rights has to be understood as related to more 
fundamental discourses about individual rights and collective group-specific rights.  
 
Finland provides a good example of the possibilities and challenges in implementing 
minority rights in developed welfare states. Finnish society, as other Nordic societies, is 
characterised by relatively high socio-economic equality. It is mostly regarded as self-
evident that the task of the state is to provide and support equality among all citizens. A 
universal provision of rights and services constitutes a fundamental part of the Nordic 
welfare state model, as well as the understanding that it is the state (rather than the 
individuals themselves or their communities) that is the provider of welfare and equality 
to all its citizens. The challenge facing minority policies in the Nordic countries is 
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therefore seldom related to an acceptance of equal rights for all citizens, but the 
challenge is often related to an acceptance of cultural diversity and group-specific rights. 
In accordance with the Nordic welfare state model, minority policies can only be 
introduced ‘from above’ by the state itself. Minority policies are therefore part of the 
public welfare state structures rather than part of civil society. In this context, the 
institions and resources on which the minority depend become vulnerable to majority 
decisions. Thus, minority rights are easily falsely understood as something that the 
majority society grants to ‘its’ minorities, rather than rights that minorities inherently 
possess. As I describe in this article, the rhetoric of the Finns party often seems to 
presume an oppositional relationship between majority rights and group-specific 
minority rights.  
 
Minority rights constitute a key feature of multicultural policies (e.g. Kymlicka 1995). 
Minorities are often located in a vulnerable societal position or have special needs that 
require group-differentiated rights. Furthermore, minority rights often have to be seen in 
the context of, and as a response to nation-building and its consequences for the 
minority: ‘While minorities do make claims against the state, these must be understood 
as a response to the claims that the state makes against minorities’ (Kymlicka 2001: 2). 
The key questions in multicultural policies therefore include aspects about both the 
nature of societal groups as well as their rights. Firstly, what and who are the minorities 
that have a right to be recognised, and secondly, what group-differentiated rights and 
claims can be regarded as legitimate and possible? On the one hand, who can claim to 
be a minority and what are the rights that it can demand, and on the other hand, who can 
claim to be a majority and to what extent has it a right to impose its demands on the 
minority? Thus, there is reason to also keep in mind the sociological aspects of 
 4 
minority-majority relations, and not only the political and legal aspects of 
multiculturalism (cf. May, Modood, and Squires 2004; Gaitán-Barrera and Azeez 2015). 
The political solutions of multicultural questions often involve finding a balance among 
collective rights and individual rights. These complexities of multicultural policies are 
often obscured in public debates, where the voice of the majority and the hegemony of 
majority rule easily become dominant. As described in this article, the rhetoric of 
populist political parties can provide a case in point. 
 
 
A Theory of Minority Rights: Individual and Collective 
 
The analytical framework for this article is provided by the theory of multicultural 
policies outlined by Will Kymlicka (1995, 2001, 2010), which involves a developed 
typology of group-specific minority rights and their acceptance in western liberal 
democracies. Individual rights can be perceived as difficult to combine with collective 
rights of specific groups and minorities. In a liberal society that emphasises the equal 
rights of all individuals it can be seen as a challenge to take into account collective 
social structures and group interests. An important contribution to bridge this gap is 
provided by Kymlicka (1995) in the widely influential book Multicultural Citizenship: 
A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, which provides an overview of the discussion 
regarding multicultural policies and minority rights in western liberal democracies. In 
the book, Kymlicka argues that some forms of collective rights are fully compatible 
with liberal democratic principles. Group rights can be viewed as admissible within 
liberalism and even essential for freedom and equality. Therefore, some forms of group-
specific rights are not only possible, but a necessity in a democratic society. In many of 
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his publications, Kymlicka (e.g. 1995, 2001, 2012) outlines examples of multicultural 
solutions and minority rights protection that can be found within the framework of 
western democratic political systems. He argues that there are no simple models of 
multicultural policies that can be applied to all societies. According to Kymlicka, there 
are significant diffeerences between different minority groups and different claims for 
minority rights. Nevertheless, a general trend towards greater acceptance of minority 
rights can be found in western liberal democracies. 
 
Social scientists have in many ways expanded Kymlicka’s perspective on minority 
rights and have outlined various ways of finding political solutions that provide 
minorities with cultural protection and minority rights. Minority policies cannot be 
defined by the majority for the minority, but policies have to be defined in a true 
dialogue involving the groups in question (e.g. Parekh 2000). Multicultural policies 
often depend on the possible to create forums and institutions where compromises can 
be found between divergent interests (e.g. Rex 1996; Modood 2013). Yet, political 
negotiations do not automatically take into account the differential power relations of 
minorities and majorities and a stronger emphasis on the defence of the minority 
perspective might be needed to enable a true dialogue. 
 
Kymlicka (1995: 10–11) explicitly distinguishes between indigenous peoples and 
‘national minorities’ on one hand, and immigrant ‘ethnic groups’ on the other. This 
general dichotomy has been widely used, but also critically debated in the literature on 
multiculturalism (cf. Modood 2013). The dichotomy reflects two different modes of 
incorporation into national society, which affect the nature of the group and the type of 
relationship they desire with the larger society. Kymlicka’s own work has largely 
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focused on national minorities in so called ‘multi-nation states’, especially in Canada 
(e.g. Kymlicka 2012), but his dichotomy actually relates to a more general and universal 
distinction between different types of minorities. According to Kymlicka (1995: 10–17), 
national minorities typically wish to maintain themselves as distinct societies alongside 
the majority culture, and the minority demands various political solutions to ensure the 
survival of their distinct culture. Immigrants, however, typically wish to integrate into 
the larger society, and to be accepted as full members of it, but their demands relate to a 
modification of the mainstream society to make it more accommodating of cultural 
difference. Kymlicka (1995: 10–17) argued that demands for group-specific rights often 
have more legitimacy if the minority group in question has a long history in the nation. 
As a consequence, claims for specific group rights made by indigenous peoples and old 
national minorities are often considered more legitimate than claims made by new 
immigrant groups (Kymlicka 1995, 2001). 
 
Most studies of multicultural policies agree that there has been a clear trend in western 
democracies towards multiculturalism and minority rights from the 1970s until the 
1990s (Kymlicka 1995, 2001). After this period, some observers argue that the trend has 
shifted towards a backlash and a retreat from multiculturalism, especially visible in 
Europe (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Adamson, Triadafilopoulos and Zolberg 2011; 
Joppke 2014). This retreat includes an emphasis on a more unitary citizenship, based on 
common values and identity. One expression of the backlash is the rise of nationalist 
and populist parties, but there is also a more general belief in the failure of multicultural 
policies and a de-facto abandonment of specific policies in some states. However, 
Kymlicka (2010) argues that the narrative portraying a general rise and fall of 
multiculturalism is not a correct one. According to him, much of the debate about the 
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retreat of multiculturalism has mischaracterised the nature of multiculturalism policies 
in western democracies, as well as exaggerated the extent to which the policies have 
been abandoned. He explicitly argues that the abandonment of multiculturalism has 
mostly occurred relating to immigrant groups, while the fundamental multicultural 
issues relating to indigenous peoples and national minorities have not been disputed 
(Kymlicka 2010: 40). The nature of these political developments are the object of 
debate among political scientists. Among other issues, there is reason to differentiate 
between changes in political rhetoric and actual policy changes, although the former of 
course might contribute to the latter. This article focuses on discourses, but I will also 
point out possible political implications of the rhetoric used in populist politics. In the 
following, I will briefly outline the Finnish context of minority rights to provide a 
framework for my analysis of the rhetoric of the (True) Finns party.  
  
Minority Rights as Collective or Individual Rights in Finland 
 
At a formal level, it can be argued that multicultural policies exist to a relatively large 
extent in Finland, but the policies are not always implemented in practice (Saukkonen 
and Pyykkönen 2008). As an assessment of multicultural policies we can, for example, 
take a closer look at the three different forms of group-differentiated rights identified by 
Kymlicka (1995: 26–33): self-government rights, special representation rights and 
polyethnic rights. As I have outlined elsewhere (Wahlbeck 2013), all these three types 
of rights can in various ways be found to be implemented in the Finnish case. The 
country is not a federal state and self-government rights are only implemented in the 
case of the autonomous region of the Åland Islands. Representation rights, however, are 
found in attempts in Finland to provide cultural and ethnic minorities with 
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representation rights by the establishment of various political bodies, each with its own 
history and different types of limited political power. These bodies include the elected 
Sami Parliament, the Advisory Board for Roma Affairs, the Swedish Assembly of 
Finland (Folktinget) and the National Advisory Board on Ethnic Relations (ETNO). The 
task of these various bodies is usually to provide policy statements and to support 
cultural and linguistic activities with the help of small budgets provided by the Finnish 
government. It can be debated to what extent these various political bodies can make the 
voice of the minorities heard in Finland. To oversee the legal protection of members of 
minority groups there is also a Non-Discrimination Ombudsman (until 2015 called the 
Ombudsman for Minorities) (Wahlbeck 2013). 
 
According to Kymlicka, ‘polyethnic rights’ relate to a range of minority policies and to 
various groups with special needs, although these rights are slightly difficult to identify 
unambiguously. Kymlicka (1995) refers mainly to immigrant groups in his discussion 
of these rights. In Finland, the municipalities are the main producers of public services, 
and many of the services they provide in minority and immigrant languages can be seen 
as polyethnic rights (Wahlbeck 2013). The state also provides public services in three 
national languages (Finnish, Swedish and to a more limited extent Sami). However, the 
services in the national languages are not officially considered as specific minority 
rights, although separate linguistically-divided administrative solutions are very 
common. For example, there is a specific Swedish-speaking parallel structure in the area 
of education, although the same education laws and rules apply for both language 
groups. To apply different laws for the different language groups would, of course, be 
foreign to the Finnish principles of law and its emphasis on the equality of individuals. 
Actually, it is difficult to identify to what extent there are legal group-differentiated 
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rights as such in Finland, since the legislation tends to be explicitly based on rights of 
individuals. The collective rights for Samis constitute a case in point. The status as an 
indigenous people has been interpreted as a basis for granting cultural and linguistic 
rights, which has not been considered a difficult political issue in Finland, since these 
rights in practice mainly constitute individual rights. Yet, group-specific economic 
rights have been much more difficult to achieve. Land-rights for the Sami, and in 
connection to this the exclusive right to define who belong to the group of Samis, have 
been the object of heated debates in Northern Finland. The government of Finland has 
for a long time hesitated to ratify the ILO Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples, exactly because of the legal difficulties and political opposition in 
connection to the implementation of economic rights for the Samis as a collective group 
(cf. Lehtola 2015). Likewise, in relation to the Swedish-speaking Finns, who are much 
fewer than the Finnish-speakers, much of the public debate has focused on an 
opposition to some (real or imagined) specific collective rights of the linguistic minority, 
rather than questioning individual rights. Parallel linguistically divided public services 
might be perceived by the majority as an unjust ‘privilege’ of the minority. Thus, an 
opposition to specific group-specific rights for Swedish-speakers exist in public debates, 
but on the other hand individual cultural rights seem to be generally accepted. A key 
dilemma is that individual and collective rights are difficult to distinguish from each 
other, especially in the case of language rights. Is a language an individual resource or a 
particular collective feature of a group? Clearly, it can be both. Kymlicka (1995: 45–48) 
argues, with a reference to French-speaking Canada, that language rights can be either 
individual or collective or both, depending on the situation. The international academic 
debates indicate that linguistic rights can constitute a key issue for both the realisation 
of basic human rights and the struggle for minority rights (Kymlicka and Patten 2003). 
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In conclusion, minority rights constitute complex issues and the best solutions are often 
the outcome of extensive dialogue and complex political processes (Rex 1996; Parekh 
2000; Modood 2013). However, a key question is to what extent politicians are able and 
prepared to engage in a dialogue that can find the best solutions. Many politicians might 
look for easy populist solutions to these complicated challenges. 
 
 
The Populist True Finns Party 
 
As already mentioned, many social scientists argue that we since the late-1990s have 
witnessed a general political backlash against multicultural policies; while Kymlicka 
argues that the minority rights of old minorities have not been affected by this 
development. This leads to the question of  how  statements concerning minority 
rights  made by the political party of the (True) Finns fit this development. The 
English name of the party has varied. The widely used translation the ‘True Finns’ 
was officially changed to the ‘The Finns’ after the election in 2011, other possible 
translations of the official Finnish name Perussuomalaiset could be the ‘typical’, 
‘fundamental’, ‘average’ or ‘ordinary’ Finns. The (True) Finns party was founded in 
1995 after the dissolution of the populist Finnish Rural Party. Timo Soini, formerly 
Party Secretary of the Finnish Rural Party, has been the party leader of the (True) 
Finns Party since the year 1997. 
 
The True Finns won a historic electoral result in the Finnish parliamentary election in 
2011, increasing their share of the votes from 4 to 19 per cent. In the 2015 election the 
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party got 18 percent of the votes, which confirmed its position as one the major parties 
in Finland. The party joined, for the first time in its history, the coalition government 
formed in 2015. In the Finnish political system, broad-based coalition governments are 
more the rule than an exception, and the fact that a populist party is in government is 
not unprecedented. Still, the political values and the rhetoric of the party can be quite 
different than the ones that can be found among other Finnish political parties. In the 
following,  I analyse statements on minority rights in the official party programmes in 
the elections in 2011 and 2015 respectively (True Finns Party 2011a, 2011b; Finns 
Party 2015a, 2015b). This is followed by an analysis of explicit political statements on 
minority rights by MPs of the party. 
 
 
The Official Party Programmes 
 
The Finns party can be described as populist, nationalist and explicitly EU-critical. 
‘Populist’ is a description that is embraced by the party itself. In an official statement 
of the values of the party, populism is described as an ideology that defends the 
interests of the individual citizen against the political elite and bureaucratic power 
structures (True Finns Party  2011a). According to political  scientists (e.g. Gherghina, 
Mişcoiu and Soare 2013) a minimal definition of a populist party is that it must appeal 
to the ‘people’ and be against the ‘elites’, which the Finns party clearly claims to do. 
The political scientists Ann-Cathrine Jungar and Anders Jupskås (2014) have defined 
the party as a populist radical right party. The description as a radical right party is 
supported by its socioculturally authoritarian and value-conservative policies (cf. 
Keskinen  2012; Loch  and  Norocel  2015). Still, it is also socioeconomically centrist, 
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it has a strong agrarian background, and the rhetoric of the party tends to support 
traditional Nordic welfare policies rather than neoliberal values (cf. Elmgren  2015; 
Pyrhönen  2015). The party’s own description of its values has been the following: 
 
The True Finns Party is a nationalist Christian-social party. We do not believe in 
the right-wing power of money or in the left-wing power of the system. We firstly 
believe in and trust the human being. All political solutions have to be based on 
humanity, in which a sense of community is essential. A sense of community is to 
a very large extent based on shared values and norms, and these also provide the 
possibility to develop a society and a nation. Democracy is people’s power, and 
this is not possible without a people. The people and humanity are both primarily 
based on the sense of a community. (True Finns Party 2011a, translation from 
Finnish by the author)  
 
As these value statements describe, the populist ideology of the party make references 
to the existence of a people that make up a unitary community, which needs shared 
values and norms to develop a society and a nation. Furthermore, the political rhetoric 
and the discourse provided by the party portray it as the representative of the Finnish 
people and the Finnish nation, i.e. the true and typical Finns that constitute the ‘real’ 
majority of the population in Finland, a stance that is reflected in the name of the party. 
In the parliamentary election in 2011, the party published a political programme 
consisting of a collection of statements. The party position on specific cultural questions 
and minority issues is outlined in some parts of this program. The need for a defence of 
an abstract ‘Finnishness’ is explicit in the rhetoric: 
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Finnishness is Finland’s gift to the world and the key to success for our society, 
also in the 21st century. We defend multiculturalism through defending our 
national identity. For True Finns, patriotism means selflessness. We must treasure 
the Finnish language. Cultural appropriations must be targeted to reinforce 
Finnish identity. Pseudo-artistic postmodernists can find their funding in the free 
market. The Finnish Broadcasting Company must be Finnish and deliver high 
quality. (True Finns Party 2011b)  
 
In general, the election programme in 2011 display a concern for the future of Finnish 
culture, Finnish identity and Finland as an independent nation. The nation is under 
threat and needs to be defended. The threat comes from various societal developments, 
like globalisation, urbanisation, the EU, and from a multicultural society. However, the 
threats are not really explained in the programme and remain largely abstract. 
 
In the most recent parliamentary election in 2015, the official party programmes of the 
Finns Party (2015a) became more detailed. Although the rhetoric followed similar 
lines of argument, the references to the intrinsic value of Finnish culture became less 
pronounced. Instead, general economic arguments were emphasised and the party 
portrayed itself as the defender of the economic interests of the Finnish people. This 
defence was pronounced both in relation to the Finnish state, the EU and in relation to 
immigration and minority groups in Finland. This ‘defence of the Finnish people’ had 
been part of the rhetoric already in earlier election campaigns. In a discourse analysis 
of anti-immigration debates supporting the party,  Niko Pyrhönen (2015) argues that 
the debates since the early 2000s have been characterised by an exclusionary ‘welfare 
nationalism’. Thus, like the previous party programme, the 2015 programme of the 
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party can be seen as being implicitly built upon a dichotomy between the real Finnish 
people and outsiders who threatened the interests of the Finnish people and who did 
not have an equal right to a share of the economic welfare. This dichotomy becomes 
especially evident in the specific programme for an immigration policy of the party, 
which in practice was formulated by the so-called ‘immigration-critical’ activists of 
the party. The programme concludes that ‘Finland needs to abandon the last 25 years 
of thought that immigration and multiculturalism are intrinsically necessary and 
desirable concepts’ (Finns Party 2015b: 7). The programme includes general demands 
for a consideration of the presumed economic burden of immigration, more restrictive 
asylum policies, restrictions on family reunification and end of all presumed policies 
of ‘positive discrimination’. Furthermore, the programme states that gaining Finnish 
citizenship should not be regarded as a right, it should be a reward achieved after 
successful integration only. 
 
A rhetoric that makes references to social issues, including national welfare and 
individual equality, is clearly found in the more recent party programmes. The 
culturalist and radical rhetoric of the election campaign in 2011 seems to have been 
downplayed in the more recent official party documents, a development that might be 
related to the party’s ambitions to be in government. Still, as I will outline below, 
there are statements and activities of individual MPs of the party that continue to 
represent a pronounced exclusionary culturalist and nationalist rhetoric. 
 
Minority Policy Statements of the True Finns MPs 
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The type of political statements found in the official party programmes of the (True) 
Finns Party are  perhaps  not  that  unusual, and similar ideas can be found among 
many other populist politicians in Europe. However, a more radical and extreme 
picture of the party emerges in the public statements on multiculturalism and minority 
rights made by some of the elected MPs. In 2011, the party became a relatively 
diverse party involving  both traditional populist politicians as well as political 
extremists coming from a variety of nationalist, far-right and so-called ‘immigration-
critical’ networks. Finnish anti-immigration activists had a visible presence on the 
internet in the early 2000s, and many of these activists subsequently joined the True 
Finns Party, and undoubtedly also provided the party with many voters (cf. Pyrhönen  
2015). In the following, the focus is on MPs who belong to these anti-immigration 
activists, since the party statements on minority policies mainly are produced by these 
politicians. 
 
A well-known commentator on minority politics in the party is Jussi Halla-aho, who 
was elected an MP in 2011 and a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) in 2014. 
He has a political history as an independent blogger, and has gained his reputation for 
testing the limits of free speech, particularly in his anti-immigration, anti-
multiculturalism, and anti-Islamist writings. In 2009, he received a court sentence for 
disturbing religious worship, which propelled his later political career. The case was 
ultimately settled by the Supreme Court in 2012, where the conviction was confirmed 
and a conviction for hatred against an ethnic group was added to the sentence. In his 
blog Halla-aho has, among other issues, warned about the dnger of a Muslim invasion 
in Europe. According to him, the immigration of Muslims has created a danger for the 
Western civilisation and a need to fight for the survival of Western culture, in which he 
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includes Finnish culture. According to this narrative, the culprits for this dangerous 
threat to Western civilisation are the ‘multiculturalists’ who have opened the borders of 
Europe. The colourful statements made by Halla-aho  have been widely reported by the 
media in Finland, and are well known among the general public. Despite, or perhaps 
because of, these statements, he has gained a large electoral support in all elections he 
has taken part in. Because of the large number of votes Halla-Aho and other 
immigration-critical candidates are able to gather, they have also gained a strong 
position within the (True) Finns Party. For example, Halla-aho was one of the main 
authors of the party’s official immigration policy document in 2015 (although he did not 
take part in the parliamentary election himself, declaring that he preferred to continue as 
an MEP rather than an MP). 
 
As outlined earlier in this article, Kymlicka (2010) has argued that that the 
abandonment of multiculturalism has mostly occurred in policies relating to immigrant 
groups, while the fundamental multicultural issues relating to indigenous peoples and 
national minorities have not been disputed. This argument is not supported by my 
analysis; on the contrary, the minority policy statements of the party MPs are not 
limited to immigrant questions. There are also examples of explicit minority rights 
statements that relate to majority and minority relations in general. After the 
parliamentary election in 2011, the True Finns were encouraged in the media to make 
clear their position on racism. This led to a proclamation signed by the whole True 
Finns group of MPs ‘Against Discrimination, Racism and Violence’ on 25 May 2011 
(YLE 2011). The collective statement proclaims that the MPs denounce all forms of 
racism and discrimination. In the text they stress (this is done in bold letters in the 
original press release in Finnish) the following: They denounce racism against any 
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group regardless of whether it is a majority or a minority. Furthermore, they denounce 
all discrimination or privileges based on ethnicity, language, culture, religion or similar 
factors. They also demand that all political and public decision makers and discussants 
take discrimination and violence equally seriously regardless of whether the victim is a 
member of a minority or a majority. ‘We find univocally, that the authorities have to 
treat everybody as an individual, not as a representative of an ethnic, cultural or similar 
group. Nobody should ever, in any situation, be punished or rewarded for his 
background’ (YLE 2011, translation from Finnish by the author). This proclamation can 
be seen as a statement against differential treatment and group-specific rights, and thus 
more generally against minority rights. Indeed, the subsequent comments made by 
various True Finns MPs made it clear that this was exactly how it was intended to be 
understood. Halla-aho, who largely had formulated the text, explained for the media that 
this was a statement against all forms of differential treatment, including ‘positive 
discrimination’ and ‘minority quotas’.  
 
In this discourse, among politicians of the True Finns Party, minority rights seem to 
be regarded as something that diminishes the rights of the majority. This general 
impression is further strengthened by other actions of party MPs. In the autumn of 
2011, MP Olli Immonen suggested that the office of the Ombudsman for Minorities 
should be abolished, since according to him its activities had tried to limit the freedom 
of speech guaranteed by the Constitution of Finland. In the budget debates in the 
Parliament, the party MPs has among other issues suggested cut backs in the funding 
of the Swedish Assembly and a renegotiation of the economic relation with the 
autonomous region of the Åland Islands (Pyrhönen 2012, 135).  
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The logic behind the rhetoric of the MPs seems to be that there exists a majority that is 
regarded as the discriminated and threatened group in society. This reverse logic 
resembles what the Finnish sociologist Suvi Keskinen (2012) has labelled a ‘politics 
of reversal’ in anti-immigration politics in the Nordic countries. She argues that while 
equality is a core value of the Nordic welfare state model, the anti-immigration 
discourse has been able to re-mould the discourse of gender equality and use it for the 
purpose of an exclusionary agenda portrayed as free speech supporting equality 
(Keskinen 2012: 270). I would like to add that a ‘politics of reversal’ is not limited to 
the discourse of gender equality. Actually, a reverse logic seems to be applied to 
minority-majority relations and minority rights in general. In the rhetoric of the Finns 
Party, Finnish people are portrayed as a majority group that is the victim of 
discrimination and a group whose interests need to be defended. 
 
After the parlaimentary election in 2015, the so-called ‘immigration-critical’ activists 
seem to have consolidated a strong position in the party. The activists include MP 
Immonen who triggered a huge public debate in Finland in 2015. In June 2015 he 
participated in a nationalist gathering attended by members of the small neo-Nazi 
group the Finnish Defence League, whose members have been involved in numerous 
criminal activities, including violent attacks. This was followed by a in Finnish media 
widely reported Facebook-update on 25 July 2015 where MP Immonen wrote (for 
some unknown reason in English): 
 
I'm dreaming of a strong, brave nation that will defeat this nightmare called 
multiculturalism. This ugly bubble that our enemies live in, will soon enough 
burst into a million little pieces. Our lives are entwined in a very harsh times. 
 19 
These are the days, that will forever leave a mark on our nations future. I have 
strong belief in my fellow fighters. We will fight until the end for our homeland 
and one true Finnish nation. The victory will be ours. (YLE 2015) 
 
This update was published only a few days after the 4-year anniversary of the Breivik 
terrorist attacks in Norway. The resemblance of the rhetoric with that of the Breivik 
manifesto, together with MP Immonen’s documented contacts with neo-Nazis, led to 
an unprecedented public furore in Finland and numerous anti-racist demonstrations in 
2015. Immonen himself explained that he had been misunderstood and he condemned 
non-parliamentary methods in the fight against multiculturalism, but he also defended 
his right to free speech. Yet, he did not explain for main stream media exactly what he 
meant by multiculturalism. The public furore and heated political debate that followed 
his original statement probably also prevented any dialogue about what exactly 
‘multiculturalism’ might be. He did explain in a web-journal of the Finns Party that he 
“fights politically against extreme forms of multiculturalism”, and gave as explicit 
examples quotas for immigrant children at municipal summer camps, the prohibition 
of Suvivirsi and Christmas celebrations in schools, and the increase of radicalization in 
Finland (Suomen Uutiset 29 July 2015). The infamous statement made by Immonen 
may have been inspired by the general discourse of the presumed ‘failure of 
multiculturalism’, which has been voiced also by mainstream politicians in Europe (cf. 
Joppke 2014). Many activists in the Finns Party felt that the negative attention the 
statement had received was out of proportion. For example, Halla-aho in a Facebook 
update on 26 July 2015 found it to be strange that it was considered news that 
politicians in the Finns Party were opposed to multiculturalism. Party activists have 
also widely and repeatedly held that the party is a victim of negative reporting in the 
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main stream media. According to this view, it is the ‘established media’ and 
politically biased journalists that are to be blamed for the negative portrayal of the 
party. 
 
It is difficult to judge to what extent the Finns Party accepts or shares the more radical 
political opinions of their MPs. The party leader Timo Soini has repeatedly and over a 
long period of time declined to take a responsibility for the individual racist 
statements of his MPs (e.g. BBC 2013). The case of Immonen in 2015 largely 
followed the pattern of previous media attention on radical statements by MPs of the 
Finns party; the party as such is reluctant to explicitly condemn the statements1. There 
seems to be a repeating pattern where politicians active in the party express extreme 
political views, while the party officials decline to take any responsibility for the 
views and declare them to be the private opinions of individual MPs. In any case, the 
party has accepted both Halla-aho and Immonen as members of the party, and the 
party has provided them with a platform and position from which they can get their 
voice heard. It can be concluded that the Finns party has been unable or unwilling to 
delimit itself from extreme nationalists and the far right, and it is an open question 
how much power and influence the radical so called ‘immigration-critical’ group has 
within the party. The balance between the more traditional value-conservative 
populists and the radical ‘immigration-critical’ fractions of the party has probably 
become more delicate since the party joined the coalition government in 2015. As a 
member of a coalition government, the party has been forced to make many difficult 
political compromises concerning EU-policy, austerity measures and immigration and 
asylum policy, which many of the more radical party members and supporters 
undoubtedly have found difficult to swallow. Yet, the party also depends on the 
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electoral support from the more radical voters and the party policies in 2015 may be 
interpreted as a double strategy to be both a responsible government coalition partner 




This article has described an explicit opposition to minority rights among members of 
the populist party of the (True) Finns Party. It has not been possible in this article to 
give an exhaustive overview of the opinions of the party, or of its MPs. For example, 
the MPs have given various explanations for their political statements. Still, the point in 
presenting the public statements in this article is to exemplify the fundamental 
questioning of minority rights that we can find today in populist rhetoric. In the election 
programmes, the Finns party portrays itself as the representative of the Finnish people, 
the Finnish nation, i.e. the true Finns that are assumed to constitute the real majority of 
the population. Furthermore, this people and nation are portrayed as being under threat 
and in need to be defended. In this political discourse, multiculturalism and minority 
rights constitute threats to the rights of the majority. The discourse is supported by a 
rhetoric that presumes an oppositional relationship between majority rights and group-
specific minority rights. Thus, the discourse paints an imaginary picture of a people and 
a nation that is threatened by the rights of minorities, who by definition do not belong to 
the people and the nation. As a populist party, the Finns party claims to be a 
representative of the people and a political mobilisation for a defence of the majority is 
called upon. In this populist political discourse, minorities do not seem to have any 
rights of their own; the only thing that counts is majority rule. The general discourse 
seems to be that rights belong to the majority and not to the minority; members of 
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majorities can claim rights but members of minorities cannot claim rights. If cultural 
minorities claim cultural rights it might be considered a threat to society, since society 
according to the party’s own value statement is based on a unitary culture, i.e. ‘the 
shared values and norms’ of the people (True Finns Party 2011a).  
 
As outlined in the beginning of this article, Kymlicka (2010) argues that the 
international backlash and retreat from multiculturalism has mainly occurred in relation 
to the acceptance of ethnic-cultural diversity among immigrant groups. Likewise, 
studies of populist parties in Scandinavia have described the central role played by anti-
immigration policies in the policy agenda of the parties (Widfeldt  2015; Hellström  
2016).  It appears that these assessments are not completely accurate in the case of the 
minority policy statements of the (True) Finns party and its MPs. The statements that 
have been presented in this article are not only about policies relating to immigrants. 
Actually, any real or imagined minority who is not considered truly Finnish, or not 
considered sufficiently representing ‘Finnishness’, can become the target of the rhetoric. 
Furthermore, the rhetoric is not limited to specific policies; instead the fundamental 
principles of group-specific rights for minorities are disputed. In populist rhetoric, the 
appeal to the ‘people’ is probably easy to combine with an emphasis on the rights of the 
‘majority’, but as I have described in this article, the rhetoric can also take one step 
further and connect a defence of majority rights with an opposition to collective group-
specific rights for minorities. In fact, the 2011 statement of the MPs of the party 
displays an explicit attack on differential treatment and minority rights. The discourse 
against group-specific rights seems to be based on an extreme individualistic 
perspective on society. The MPs ‘find univocally, that the authorities have to treat 
everybody as an individual’ (YLE 2011). 
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The populist rhetoric has simplified complex political issues; slogans referring to 
individual rights, equality and welfare are frequently used as arguments by the (True) 
Finns party. The populist and individualistic rhetoric might actually be one reason for 
the popular support of the party. In the case of Finland, individual equality is a political 
goal which finds much support among the general public and a goal that can be 
incorporated into the idea of the Nordic welfare state. In Finnish society, public 
administration and legal traditions are largely based on a universal and individualistic 
tradition; in this tradition collective group-differentiated rights easily seem to become 
far more controversial and complicated political questions than is the case with 
individual rights. Public services are in Finland usually provided according to universal 
principles based on traditional individual rights, but some specific group-differentiated 
rights have also been applied, most clearly in the case of indigenous peoples and old 
national minorities. As outlined in this article, these (presumed or real) collective group-
specific rights are the ones that often become the target of the populist rhetoric of the 
(True) Finns party. 
 
Social scientists have outlined various models of multicultural policies that combine 
group-specific rights and individual rights. Yet, there is reason to emphasise that the 
minority also needs to get its voice heard in the political arena. The alternative to 
making the voice of the minority  heard is the hegemony of majority rule, which leaves 
the minorities wholly dependent on the goodwill of the state and its majority. As the 
populist rhetoric presented in this article indicates, this goodwill is not always present. 
Rather, the rhetoric can be based on a reverse logic where the members of the majority 
are portrayed as the victims of discrimination. The possible implications of this rhetoric 
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are not only limited to discursive changes. Minorities are often dependent on the state 
and state policy. In the Nordic welfare state model, welfare services are administered by 
a large public sector, which in practice also implement the minority policies. Minority 
policies are therefore largely subject to political control and dependent on state funding, 
which makes minorities vulnerable in the case of policy change. Thus, political parties 
are able to significantly influence minority policies. It is therefore important to examine 
the minority rights discourse found in statements of populist parties. As the case of the 
Finns Party indicates, these parties can obtain mass electoral support and the possibility 
to influence policies from positions in government.  
 
Notes 
                                                 
1  In connection to the widespread public debate following the Facebook update of 
Immonen in 2015, the slow reaction and relatively modest condemnations from the 
Finns Party drew attention in Finnish media (e.g. YLE 2015). The party leader Timo 
Soini was on holiday and did not comment on the incident. The Party Secretary Riikka 
Slunga-Poutsalo commented that Immonen’s words were not well chosen, but the party 
as such did not take any immediate actions since it was up to the parliamentary group to 
discuss the issue with Immonen, when they eventually would meet two months later. In 
the end, Immonen was, formally at his own request, temporarily suspended from the 
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